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Background/Context: Based on archival material, the following paper analyzes the politi-
cal strategies of the early OECD stakeholders in transforming schooling from a cultural to a 
technological system and how they were in need of standardizing different existing patterns of 
thoughts or institutional behaviors in the member countries. The European standardization 
process observable in the early 1960s, triggered by the OECD, affected the organization of the 
educational policies on a ministerial level designed to influence the national school systems 
according to a specific ideology.
Purpose: The paper asks how this new managerial ideology was transported, disseminated, 
and implemented and finds its answer in a specific rhetoric that bypassed politically taboo 
themes and that covered up the clear strategies: The new iron cage of accountability was based 
on omitting controversial topics.
Research Design: A contextual reconstruction of the discourse emerging from and reinforc-
ing the process of standardization and the dissemination of specific ways of educational 
planning, such as statistics, and with them specific ideologies of how society and its citizens 
should be shaped.
Conclusions/Recommendations: Revisiting today’s educational bureaucracy and its logic of 
expertise, standards, and accountability by reconstructing its origins in the Cold War and by 
that challenging the ideology of uniformity and accepting plurality as the condition of life of 
late modern societies.
Traditionally, the Cold War is understood as a continuous political and 
military tension between two global powers, the West, dominated by 
the United States with its allies organized in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the East, dominated by the Soviet Union with 
its allies organized in the Warsaw Pact. Whereas this traditional view has 
been focusing on the conflicts and proxy wars around the world, schol-
ars have—foremost after the end of the Cold War in 1989—started to ex-
amine the intended and unintended domestic effects of the Cold War in 
politics, science policy, culture, and education (Evans, 2011; Fousek, 2000; 
Gilman, 2003; Hartman, 2008; Leslie, 1993; Rudolph, 2002; Solovey, 2013; 
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Urban, 2010): The Western ideals of the Cold War were not simply for de-
cades handed down and defensible ideals but subject to changes towards 
specific ideals or systems of reasoning that had been dominant in concrete 
models of successful cooperation between policy, science, and technologi-
cal innovation during the Second World War. 
These new ideals or systems of reasoning were not in any case simple de-
velopments of the older, traditional ideals about national coexistence, de-
mocracy, and justice, but sometimes quite opposed to them, and it usually 
took shocking events such as the Korean War (1950–1953) or the launch of 
the Soviet satellite Sputnik (1957) to help these new ideas little by little to 
be more broadly implemented within the traditional culture—and by that 
transforming it. These new ideals or systems of reasoning also affected, 
among other ideas, education, which henceforth was made accountable in 
a specific way to serve these new ideals. This process of making education 
accountable involved a change towards standardization, centralization, 
and scientification in education that was, up to then, rather foreign to the 
traditional way of the local organization and local control of education. 
Standardization, centralization, and scientification of education became 
visible foremost after Sputnik, but it was already laid out in the epitome of 
the new ideology, in the vannevar Bush’s Report to the President in 1945, 
called the Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945).1 In 1944, Bush had been asked by 
President Roosevelt to prepare a report on (among others) the following 
question: “What can be done, consistent with military security, and with 
the prior approval of the military authorities, to make known to the world 
as soon as possible the contributions which have been made during our 
war effort to scientific knowledge?” (Bush, 1945). This question was of 
utmost importance for it asked that strategies developed during wartime 
be applied in peacetime. Bush’s report related the future fight against 
diseases, defense against aggressors, and the establishment of a welfare 
state closely to “new knowledge” that “can be obtained only through basic 
scientific research” (Bush, 1945, section Summary of the Report), and do-
ing science meant a teamwork of experts, exactly as it had been practiced 
during the Second World War—efficient cooperation, developed during 
the war, is irrelevant of war or peace, but dependent on the progress of 
science: “Science can be effective in the national welfare only as a member 
of a team, whether the conditions be peace or war. But without scientific 
progress no amount of achievement in other directions can insure our 
health, prosperity, and security as a nation in the modern world” (Bush, 
1945a). Evidently, science education as a program for the “renewal of our 
scientific talent” (Bush, 1945, Chapter 4) was of the highest importance 
for the future, and thus the future of the nation becomes a question of 
educational policy. vannevar Bush quotes in his report his friend James 
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B. Conant, the President of Harvard University and at the time also head 
of National Defense Research Committee, NDRC: “So in the last analysis, 
the future of science in this country will be determined by our basic edu-
cational policy” (Bush, 1945, Chapter 4). 
However, when Sputnik was launched on 4 October 1957 the Cold 
War became thoroughly educationalized (Martens & Wolf, 2009, p. 365, 
Tröhler, 2013) and earlier tendencies of education reform proposals be-
came massively radicalized.2 One of the most prominent spokesmen for 
educational reform was Harvard President James Bryant Conant who had 
been quoted in the Bush report Science: The Endless Frontier in 1945 (see 
above) (Urban, 2010, p. 83f) and another was Hyman George Rickover 
(1900–1986), known as the “Father of the Nuclear Navy.” Shortly after 
Sputnik, Rickover accused American education and its ideology of “Life 
Adjustment” and demanded more knowledge rather than cross-curricu-
lar competencies: “If the local school continued to teach such pleasant 
subjects as ‘Life Adjustment’ and ‘How to know when you are really in 
love,’ instead of French and physics, its diploma would be, for all the 
world to see, inferior” (Time Magazine, 2 December 1957). In this con-
text—for the first time, if I am not mistaken—the idea of national educa-
tion standards defined by central experts was proposed together with a 
system of incentives: 
In some fashion we must devise a way to introduce uniform stan-
dards into American education. It would be best to set up a pri-
vate agency, a Council of Scholars, financed by our colleges and 
universities as a joint undertaking—or perhaps by Foundations. 
This council would set a national standard for the high school di-
ploma, as well as for the scholastic competence of teachers. High 
schools accepting this standard would receive official accredita-
tion, somewhat on the order of the accreditation given medical 
schools and hospitals. (Time Magazine, 2 December 1957)3
One of the direct consequences of Sputnik was the passing of the 
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) signed on 2 September 1958, 
and the relevant debates within and outside of Congress were reconstruct-
ed exemplarily by Barbara Barksdale Clowse in her book Brainpower for 
the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense Education Act of 1958 
(Barksdale Clowse, 1981) and—somewhat complementary—by Wayne 
J. Urban in his book More Than Science and Sputnik. The National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (Urban, 2010). Urban’s emphasis lies in the fact that 
NDEA did not only foster the sciences—it certainly did—but also includ-
ed visions of vocational training, concepts of student loans, development 
of educational media, strategies of college teacher education, and the 
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promotion of statistical services (Urban, 2010, p. 3). And most of all, it in-
cluded an idea that had been unsuccessfully launched for 20 years, namely 
the idea of federal aid for the individual state school systems without pro-
moting “federal control” over education (Urban, 2010, pp. 14f., 17).4
The idea of federal aid (with or without control) brought a new dimen-
sion to the debate, for it transcended the problem of the adaption of the 
course of studies in the direction of more science. It raised the question 
about governance. Certainly, on the legal level this question of governance 
was explicitly not affected: 
The defense of this Nation depends upon the mastery of mod-
ern techniques developed from complex scientific principles. . 
. . We must increase our efforts to identify and educate more of 
the talent of our Nation. This requires programs that will give as-
surance that no student of ability will be denied an opportunity 
for higher education because of financial need. . . . The Congress 
reaffirms the principle and declares that the States and local communities 
have and must retain control over and primary responsibility for public ed-
ucation. The national interest requires, however, that the Federal 
Government give assistance to education for programs which are 
important to our defense (NDEA, Title I—General Provisions, 
Findings and Declaration of Policy, Sec. 101., italics added)
However, this would prove to be an illusion, for stakeholders and con-
cerned people wanted to know what effects the federal money that was 
spent during the following years in education would have. Under President 
Lyndon Johnson’s administration and the aspiration of a Great Society, 
Congress passed a second National Educational Act in 1965, the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act. This act shows precisely the dilemma of edu-
cational administration: It aimed at centralized power in a constitutional, 
legal, and cultural context that was and is highly local. The Act dealt with 
this dilemma by committing to noninterference with regard to a national 
curriculum on the one side and by allocating federal money for profes-
sional development, instructional materials, and educational programs of 
desired school subjects on the other. In accordance with the constitutions, 
the local schools should not be forced to accept curriculum and teaching 
reforms, but they were to be motivated by incentives.
However, to invest billions of dollars and not be sure about the effects 
was unsatisfying for the capital providers in their Cold War mission. The 
constitutional sovereign right of the local authorities prevented the cen-
tral administration from seeing what kind of results their money effec-
tively had in the schools. It is precisely here that the idea of comprehen-
sive and comparative testing idea in education arose. The instrument was 
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the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in 1964, which 
developed tools of comparative testing that were used at a global level in 
the PISA program 35 years later and that started the Journal of Educational 
Measurement in 1964. However, this comparative testing initiative was any-
thing but undisputed (American Association of School Administrators; 
National Education Association of the United States, 1966), for it was un-
derstood—rightly—not only as generating data, but as instrument in a 
new system of school governance in which centralized experts were trying 
to govern local authorities in education by standards and coercing schools 
to be accountable to federal standards. When in 1969—after having solved 
major statistical problems—the first national assessment in education was 
held, a wave of publications debated the visions and effects of educational 
accountability and introduced by that a concept—educational account-
ability— that had been hardly known up to then.5
The question is how educational accountability could possibly have be-
come a core concept in educational policy in roughly 10 years after Sputnik. 
Its introduction included a Second World War and Cold War ideology of 
problem solving, the faith in experts, some skepticism towards democracy 
(Martens & Wolf, 2009, p. 372; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, p. 130), and a con-
siderable Trust in Numbers (Porter, 1995) combined with a “’horse race’ 
mentality” (Kamens, 2013, p. 117). This article will reconstruct that first 
part of this transformation after Sputnik, that is, the rise of the new faith 
in experts, the rise of educational planners, and statistics. The thesis I want 
to demonstrate is that this process was possible mainly by a specific rheto-
ric that was developed as a core means of the change management. The 
rhetoric was able to level cultural and national differences, and this allowed 
these new ideals of educational governance to become accepted by the 
participants and thus to be implemented in their respective places. My ex-
ample are the years leading up to 1965, when the individual member coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) had to take over the funding of educational programs that had 
previously been funded by the OECD (and that means it was funded 50% 
by the United States). This ideology was transported and disseminated by 
a specific rhetoric that bypassed politically taboo themes and covered up 
the clear strategies of governance. This paved the way for the process of 
standardization and the implementation of not only formal adaptation of 
the organization of education but also, and in particular, specific ways of 
educational planning, such as statistics, and with them specific ideologies 
of how society and its citizens should be shaped. Only a few years later 
on, educational accountability had become a “normal” part in educational 
policy with a tendency to be a treated as fetish (Sellar & Lingard, 2013).
I will demonstrate my thesis in five steps. First, I will shed some light on 
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the broader ideological context of the early years of the OECD, that is of 
its educational commitment (1). Next I will focus on taboo themes (2) 
and the disguising rhetoric (3). In the next step, I examine in particular 
one major project of the early OECD, with six Mediterranean countries 
at the center (4) to check the sustainability of the early efforts in educa-
tional planning after a fundamental revision of the OECD activities in 
1964 (5).
THE OEEC, THE IDEOLOGY OF “DEvELOPMENT,” AND ITS 
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, 
was founded in 1961 as a successor to the Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) (1948–1961). The OEEC had been an 
integral part of the Marshall Plan, dedicated to a European economic up-
swing and—even more so—to the integration of the European nations. 
All the Western European countries, with the exception of Finland, which 
was under the strong influence of the Soviet Union and thus in a delicate 
situation, and including Greece and Turkey, which were seen in danger of 
turning to Communism,6 and from 1950 Yugoslavia, a somewhat reluctant 
partner of the Eastern bloc, benefited from the American grants and eco-
nomic cooperation. It is in this context that the notion of the economic 
miracle was used.
The transition from the OEEC to the OECD in the years 1960–19617 was 
on one hand due to the inner-European tensions on the question of cus-
toms and tariffs in the context of the idea of a European free-trade area, 
and on the other hand due to Charles de Gaulle’s strong opposition to the 
Anglo-Saxon predominance in Europe. The inevitable transition from the 
OEEC to the OECD not only included new countries to the organization, 
such as Canada and the United States, but signified a change that became 
tangible in the new name. “Europe” had been deleted for obvious rea-
sons, the notion of cooperation remained, but a new notion appeared that 
proved to be highly significant—namely, the notion of development. The 
Western countries should not only cooperate but also develop as a whole. 
Behind the notion of development—a notion that is not suspicious per 
se—is almost the whole ideological assumptions of the Western world 
and foremost of the United States (Gilman, 2003). Like the Soviets for 
the Eastern bloc, the United States for the Western world headed a ho-
mogenous world under its leadership. In order to discredit the compet-
ing Soviet agenda, leading intellectuals in the United States labeled the 
communist ambitions “ideological,” whereas the Western self-perception 
was labeled “the end of ideology” (Bell, 1960). The self-ascription as 
TCR, 116, 090304  Change Management in the Governance of Schooling
7
being free of ideology was deduced from the self-assessment that the 
United States was the most developed country in the world. Looking at 
its own history, there was little doubt that the United States had solved 
the major problems of modern societies by far the best. But its self-assert-
ed American exceptionalism did not prevent the rise of the idea that, at 
the same time, its unique example was also universal and exemplary. In 
other words, the United States was both unique and a model for others; 
to create a harmonized globe it had something to offer the world by its 
very example (Tröhler, 2010). 
The self-perception of being both free of ideology and the most de-
veloped country allowed a new mapping of the world. Instead of the tra-
ditional continents, the world was divided into four categories of devel-
opment: first, the developed countries, thus the United States and to a 
lesser degree Western Europe, then the developing countries, Southern 
and Southeastern Europe and to a lesser degree South America and parts 
of Asia, undeveloped countries such as most of the African countries, and 
wrongly developed countries such as the Eastern bloc. Development was 
no innocent notion but the keyword of a specific ideology that assessed 
itself as ideology free. This mapping had consequences, for it bench-
marked the process of development assistance. Correct development was 
not necessarily the development of something given, but—if necessary—
the implementation of something foreign, which indicates a process of 
standardization (Chabbott, 2003).
How this ideology was taught can be demonstrated by taking the example 
of one of the largest projects created by the OEEC in 1958. The project was a 
direct response to Sputnik. Whereas the United States reacted by founding 
NASA and by passing the National Education Defense Act (NDEA) in 1958, 
the OEEC founded the Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel 
(CSTP) in the same year, with the British chemist Alexander King—later 
cofounder of the Club of Rome—as secretary and James Ronald Gass, a 
British social scientist who did “not know much about education” (Eide, 
1990, p. 9), as deputy. This committee was named “responsible for the work 
of the Organization relating to the expansion and rational utilization of 
the scientific and technical training necessary for meeting the needs aris-
ing from economic growth” (as cited in OECD, 1965, p. 8). Training in 
relation to economic growth was the key issue of the OEEC with regard to 
the scientific advance of the Russians, and this task led to perhaps the most 
important project of the CSTP, the “The Mediterranean Regional Project.” 
The Mediterranean Regional Project was designed to help six European 
countries, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, transform 
their predominantly agricultural economies to industrial economies by de-
veloping educational measures for this transformation.
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The OEEC’s CSTP, had no doubt that there were “common aims and 
responsibilities in the more advanced and in the developing countries” 
(OEEC/C(60)207), and the OECD repeated this assessment one year lat-
er in 1961 (OECD/C(61)70, p. 5). Accordingly, the CSTP confirmed that 
problems in the developed and the developing countries were not “differ-
ent in kind” and that the “real difference was in fact one of degree only” 
(STP/M(61)1, 2nd session, p. 14): “The difference is one of more and 
less, and not of otherness, and the goal is to initiate ‘a simple process of 
catching up with the best’” (Maddison, 1962, p. 18). At a 4-week training 
course for ongoing educational planners, an American economist from 
Ohio State University, Samuel C. Kelley, spoke to the participants. Kelley 
had made a name for himself with analyses of insurances and income esti-
mations in North Dakota (Kelley, 1954, 1956). Kelley told the future edu-
cational planners: 
The general nature of the problem, within the Mediterranean 
Regional Project group, is obviously similar. Each country will re-
quire a great increase in the general educational level and in par-
ticular, in the proportion of students continuing their education 
to advanced secondary and higher levels of education. Each will 
require a redirection of the flow of graduates from educational in-
stitutions to the various occupational and industrial sectors. Each 
will require massive population movements from agriculture to 
other branches and extensive vertical movement between occu-
pational levels. (Kelley, 1962, p. 29f)
“National differences” are recognized, but only on the terms that they 
will “necessitate somewhat different emphases on the objectives of the 
work,” so that “some flexibility will be necessary” in order to “make the 
maximum contribution to national problems” (STP(62)19, p. 14).
BYPASSING TABOO THEMES
The OECD has often proclaimed that it is a toothless tiger for its lack of 
executive powers (Leibfried & Martens, 2008, p. 6; Rizvi & Lingard, 2006, 
p. 247). This might be one of the reasons why the predominant rhetoric 
used by the OECD is, to say the least, cautious. In contrast to the very clear 
ideas of development in the context of the Cold War, the rhetoric used by 
the OECD is reserved and neglects accordingly important facts and events 
and remains rather monosyllabic.
Perhaps the most striking neglect is that the OECD—although being 
a Cold War institution—did not mention notions of war, army, the Iron 
Curtain, armed forces, weapons, etc., at all, although the curricula reform 
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was heading towards more sciences and technology. This expresses the 
overall ideology of the West, to label the Soviet aspirations as “ideologi-
cal,” whereas the Western ambitions were “free of ideology” (Gilman, 
2003, p. 58, Tröhler, 2010) because they were technological. The prime 
example is the above mentioned bestseller of the time, Daniel Bell’s The 
End of Ideology (Bell, 1960) in which Bell acknowledged the eclipse of class 
ideology in Western countries and the emergence of a welfare system in 
which people would solve their problems pragmatically with the help of 
new scientific and technological tools. Technology was seen as beyond ide-
ology, numbers too, and so would the systems of accountability: neutral, 
objective, helping policy makers in their task to develop their societies. 
Accordingly, while declaring the outline of the general program of the 
CSTP in the newly founded OECD, the Council declared: “We are deeply 
convinced that science and technology, and the advanced education on 
which they must be based, are the pillars on which future social and eco-
nomic progress must be built” (OECD/C(61)70, p. 1)—apparently only 
for economic development and not for the arms race that was taking place 
in those days. The only exception in the OECD papers or publications is 
the citation of Carl von Clausewitz’ book, On War (first published as Vom 
Kriege in 1832), with discussion of Clausewitz’ definition of strategy in edu-
cational planning (Lyons, 1962, p. 57).8 
Another term that is missing, and this may be more surprising, is the 
notion of democracy. Although the development of the Western societies 
was allegedly the main aim of the OECD, the mutual connection between 
education and democracy had been emphasized over and over since the 
French Revolution in 1789. In all the internal papers and publications 
between 1960 and 1964 that I have been reading, democracy is named 
once. In this one instance, in the training course for ongoing educational 
planners mentioned earlier, the expert tried to convince his audience that 
in a “political democracy” it is important that the citizens know about the 
influences of technology, economy, and the social and political spheres on 
their own lives (Parnes, 1962, p. 74).9 Alternative notions to democracy do 
not exist, again with one exception—namely, the notion of a “free society” 
(Kelley, 1962, p. 33). 
In accordance with this neglect is the almost total absence of mention of 
important figures in global politics. President John F. Kennedy is the only 
political leader who is mentioned, and again only one time, and again on 
the occasion of the training course. The British economist John Ernest 
vaizey, who published The Cost of Social Services in 1954 (vaizey, 1954), on 
The Costs of Education in 1958 (vaizey, 1958), and The Economics of Education 
in 1962 (vaizey, 1962a), mentioned John F. Kennedy in the following con-
text. After having complained about the “prostitution of the argument for 
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social equality in education by a glorification of ‘working class culture,’” 
and after the blaming the negative effects of “a limited, academic classical 
curriculum” at school, vaizey mentions the new president of the United 
States as follows:
A truly cultivated man must surely be well-read, musical, a good 
linguist, a good conversationalist, have good taste in food, women 
and theatre, and be reasonably fit. A man like Mr. Kennedy, for 
example. But that just shows how hard it is to be civilized unless 
you are rich. And to be rich by your own efforts means you have 
to earn your living profitably. Frankly, that is what I think the cul-
tural debate reduces itself to. (vaizey, 1962b, p. 42)
In the early OECD papers and publications, there are few passages 
that reveal the unspoken cultural ideology of the OECD as clearly as this 
one does. Here, Kennedy serves as a model for the advantages of wealth, 
whereas public debates about the problems of equity and of “working 
class culture” are ridiculed. As is usual in OECD arguments, the “enemy” 
is not identified, but in this context it is clear that vaizey is attacking 
recent British publications about the working class in England, basically 
the working class sympathizing with their own culture and being skepti-
cal about the political order of capitalism—Brian Jackson and Dennis 
Marsden had just published their bestselling Education and the Working 
Class (Jackson & Marsden, 1962), and a year later Edward Palmer 
Thompson would publish his seemingly timeless sociological classic, The 
Making of the English Working Class (Thompson, 1963). The message is 
clear: In the context of the Cold War the participation of skeptics about 
capitalism is undesired and thus the persuasiveness of the ideals of de-
mocracy limited.10 
Other “hot” topics that undoubtedly were of immense importance 
to the OECD and its bearers remained unspoken, too, so for instance 
the erection of the Berlin Wall more than 50 years ago in 1961, or the 
first human spaceflight on April 12th, 1961, by Soviet cosmonaut Yuri 
Gagarin, or the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba a couple of 
days later. Not even the assassination of John F. Kennedy, according to 
John vaizey, the model of a happy man, on November 22nd, 1963, found 
any echo in the context of the OECD. Certain topics that were obviously 
in the core of the ambitions of the OECD remained simply untouched. 
This specific rhetorical character was supplemented by another, namely, 
the rhetoric that covered up, relativized, hid the sources of parts of their 
arguments and remained unclear about its own aims.
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THE DISGUISING RHETORIC
Reading the OECD papers and publications suggest that the OECD rel-
ativized its political determinations by veiling its strategy. The language 
used in the OECD papers is neither academic nor an official government 
language; it suggests merely assistance and support, but it aims at imple-
mentation of an unspoken Cold War ideology. For instance, STP wrote 
that it aimed at “helping the development of national policy towards the 
effective revision of the teaching of scientific subjects, within the frame-
work of a more general policy designed to increase the quality and quan-
tity of scientific and technical personnel” (STP(61)15, p. 1, italics added) 
and that it wanted to “stimulate interest in Member countries by helping 
the development of national policy towards the effective revision of the 
teaching of scientific subjects” (OECD/STP(61)3, p. 1, italics added)—
STP never said what it was convinced of: That it had indeed the real reci-
pes for educational reform and that the member countries should adapt 
them. Nay, STP reported solely that certain problems were “felt by most 
Member countries” (STP(62)19, p. 8, italics added) and that the member 
countries shared “strong concern” about developments and that the linking 
together of long-term economics with the development of the educational 
system was becoming “rapidly recognized in several Member countries, as 
for example in the countries participating in the Mediterranean Regional 
Project.” The experiences of this Mediterranean Regional Project “indicate 
that the effects on educational policy in the countries may become substan-
tial” (STP(62)19, p. 10, italics added) and that there was “reason to interpret 
the response to the idea of establishing pilot planning teams as an almost 
general interest in Member countries” and that the close contacts between 
the individual member countries was “likely to have a major impact not only 
on methods of approach to educational planning, but on actual policy 
decisions taken by national authorities” (STP(62)19, p. 10f, italics added).
The establishment of national planning teams co-operating with 
the O.E.C.D would at the same time provide the Organization 
with channels to national sources of information which, if prop-
erly used, should add substantially to its capacity to undertake com-
parative international studies to the benefit of all Member coun-
tries. (STP(62)19, p. 11, italics added)
However, if the OECD, or the secretariat of the “Office of Scientific and 
Technical Personnel” (STP) program, was to collect this data in order to 
“add substantially” to the member countries “it seems to be essential to re-
orient the program at work of the Secretariat” (STP(62)19, p. 16, italics 
added), which meant assigning more autonomy. This indeed happened 
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during the discussions in 1962, and self-confidently the language changes 
a little bit, for in 1963 the OECD wanted “to ensure that the right share 
of increased national effort in education is allocated to the sectors of sci-
entific and technical education which . . . are one of the keys to national 
economic development” (STP(63)14, p. 25), for it was becoming “reason-
ably clear,” as it had been reported in 1964, that there is the need “in ensur-
ing that the results of the MRP are adequately reflected in policy at the 
Ministerial level” (STP(64)17, p. 3, italics added). 
Obviously, the rhetoric hardly formulates concrete research questions, 
and the state of research is hardly ever discussed; citations of research 
are an exception and mostly restricted to the experts of the OECD. How 
the relativizing rhetoric is linked with allusion to the dominant economic 
theory of the OECD becomes clear in the following paragraph: 
Several indications point in the direction that investments in what is 
often called “human capital”—out of which investments in formal 
education constitute a major part—might be the main source of the 
unexpected part of the actual economic growth in most countries. 
It seems that under certain circumstances, the role played by invest-
ments in education may even be more important than that of invest-
ments in physical capital. (STP(62)19, p. 7, italics added) 
The OECD based its strategies on “the growing realization” that educa-
tion and training were important factors in economic growth and that 
“in fact, recent economic research has shown” that besides labor and 
physical resources there was a “‘third factor’ of production, in which 
education is presumed to be an important element” (OECD, 1965, p. 5, 
italics added). The notion of the “third factor” goes back to John vaizey, 
the OECD expert who admired John F. Kennedy for his wealth and who 
had invented the notion of the “third factor” in his affirmative discussion 
of the human capital theory (vaizey, 1961, p. 97); and it is significant 
that this original source, vaizey’s article, is not identified in the official 
OECD publications nor in an internal paper (STP(62)5, 2nd revision, p. 
5). Whereas one might interpret this practice as understatement, it can 
equally be interpreted as a more or less conscious strategy by the OECD 
to almost always refrain from identifying its authors clearly. Statements 
are to be made, not discussed.
In this context a last rhetorical factor deserves to be named—namely, 
the uncertainty about the aim of educational reform. Clearly, political 
aims are not mentioned—democracy is not envisaged as an aim. very 
often, the aim is double—namely, “economic and social development.” 
In the OECD papers, statements such as the following are repeated like 
a mantra: 
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The O.E.C.D. policy approach . . . may be simply expressed as the 
recognition that education must be looked upon as an investment 
which is intimately related to the future of economic and social 
progress of the individual nations, and of the O.E.C.D. area as a 
whole. (STP (63)5, p. 1) 
Here the notion of progress is often replaced by development. The so-
cial dimension of the OECD mission is constantly confirmed—but in a 
strikingly defensive way. It is held that the “educational strategy should be 
planned within a wider economic and social framework” and that it “may 
be mentioned that . . . social claims on educational resources have not 
been neglected” in their concrete activities (STP(64)19, p. 5). The defen-
sive character of the emphasis on the social dimension is not by chance, 
and early critics had complained about the deficit of social questions in 
the context of the OECD agenda. And it is clear why, namely because so-
cial development was seen as a result of a more important development, 
the economical: “Some persons have such a profound feeling that the 
‘true’ purpose of education is to contribute to an individual’s personal de-
velopment that they regard as almost immoral an approach to educational 
planning that is essentially economic in its orientation and which seems to 
use society’s needs for a ‘human capital’ as basic criterion” (Parnes, 1962, 
p. 73f). In 1969 this preference was confirmed (but retrospectively some-
what relativized)11 by James Ronald Gass, who meanwhile had become 
Director of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) 
in the OECD: “In the O.E.C.D. countries in the last ten years educational 
planning has developed rather on the model of economic planning: we 
have educational planners with the technical function in Ministries of 
Education for preparing educational plans which are to be ‘implement-
ed’” (Gass, 1969, p. 3).
The integration of “educational and economic policy” had been the 
ultimate goal of the early OECD (STP(62)5, (2nd Revision), p. 5). The 
promised social development and benefit was understood (mainly) as 
the/a result of economic development based on innovation in education 
(STP(62)1, pp. 3f)—that is, on the implementation of reform programs 
heading for the general expansion of the education systems, a focus on 
more sciences and mathematics in the curriculum, and the implementa-
tion of efficient teaching methods, such as the teaching machines and 
school radio and school television. The development of the pertinent 
skills of policy implementation—called “educational planning through 
experts”—was in the center of one of the most ambitious programs of the 
OEEC and the early OECD, the “Mediterranean Regional Project.”
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THE TRAINING OF EDUCATIONAL MANAGERS
The concrete educational programs within the “Committee for Scientific 
and Technical Personnel” (CSTP) were situated between the global Cold 
War ideology of development and the moderating rhetoric with regard to 
the aims, strategies, and national sovereignties of the countries to be de-
veloped. This becomes particularly clear in the “Mediterranean Regional 
Project” (abbreviated MRP), starting in 1960 with an agreement between 
what was then the OEEC and six Mediterranean countries—Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.12 It established national teams 
in each country, aimed at analyzing the way their economies could be 
developed by means of educational innovation foremost in science and 
technology. The individual teams were to be composed of a director and 
“economists, statisticians and educationalists” who were to be “appointed 
by and be reporting to the Government concerned” (OECD, 1965, p. 9). 
Therefore, the national sovereignties were guaranteed, and the OEEC was 
willing to take over 50% of the individual countries’ total costs.
In the self-perception of the OEEC and then the OECD, this cost trans-
fer of 50% of the national costs was only one of the services to the whole 
project. The provision of international experts was another, and the orga-
nization of the whole project—regular meetings, mostly in Paris, confer-
ences, etc.—was a third. And there was a fourth service that was offered 
and willingly accepted by the member countries—namely, the training of 
“specialists in human resource development” (OECD, 1965, p. 9). This 
training program was twofold; on the one hand, it included a one-year fel-
lowship for “young economists” in the frame of the national teams (STP/
GC(61)25, p. 4), and on the other hand, it provided an annual 4-week 
crash course at selected locations; in 1962 the course took place in Italy, in 
1963 in Greece, and in 1964 in Germany. The participants in these annual 
4-week crash courses were individuals not only from the Mediterranean 
countries but also from the Western European countries, which them-
selves were organized in a parallel program to the Mediterranean Regional 
Project (or MRP), a program called “Investment Planning in Educational 
Development” (IPE).
The need for trained educational planners was derived from the overall 
plan of the MRP, and this plan was quite clear and in principle simple. It 
was a four-step plan, including analysis of the present conditions, fore-
casting of the needs of the future, ideas for programs for development 
from the present to the future needs, and the financing of these programs 
(STP(63)8, p. 8). Every country participating in the MRP had to deliver 
a country report on the four aspects, present analysis, future estimation, 
implementation programs, and finance models. All four of these aspects 
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had to programmatically developed by the OECD, and it is no coincidence 
that the pioneer role of the whole endeavor was emphasized over and over 
(STP(63)8, pp. 7, 12; STP(64)17, p. 9; STP(64)19, p. 6; STP/M(64)3, p. 
20). The analysis of the present educational system was basically a statisti-
cal affair, the estimation of future needs was an issue of curriculum reform 
and teaching innovation in the context of economic forecasts under the 
umbrella term “manpower requirement” (OECD, 1962, pp. 67−165)—
both were organized in special working groups of the OECD. The ques-
tion of implementation was a matter of educational planning of human 
resources, for which the fellowship program I mentioned earlier was set up 
for the Mediterranean countries and the parallel program “Educational 
Investment Planning” for the more developed countries. And the discus-
sion of the finance models created the genre “economics of education,” 
for which the OECD created its own working group, too.
Although the first step, statistical examination of the individual coun-
tries, did not cause any specific problems per se, the question of curric-
ulum reform and efficiency and finance was developed in the realm of 
the OECD with experts from the developed countries. In the logic of the 
OECD strategists, the real crux was the training and subsequent imple-
mentation of strategists in either the ministries or in pertinent organiza-
tions in the individual countries, for the OECD had no power to interfere 
with the national sovereignties. The training programs were accordingly 
twofold: For one, they aimed to acquaint the participants with the gen-
eral theories and strategies of educational planning, and for another, they 
aimed at the same time at the participants’ conformance with the ideology 
behind the theories. 
The annual fellowship program for “Junior Experts” proved to be very 
successful, for over 300 young men applied for the 1963 program, of which 
44 were interviewed, and 16 accepted (STP(63)16, p. 1). Together with ad-
ditional interested people of all the OECD countries, these fellows came 
together in the annual 4-week courses mentioned earlier for an impressive 
four-page syllabus of the program (STP(62)2, Corrigendum 2, pp. 3-6). 
“Growth Problems in Underdeveloped Countries,” “Roles of Education 
in Developing Society,” and “Economic and Educational Planning” were 
the first 3 of 17 lectures in the 4 weeks. The list of speakers reveals a domi-
nance of Anglo-Saxons. The person responsible for the 1962 annual meet-
ing in Italy was Herbert Saul Parnes, a political scientist and economist at 
Ohio State University; four papers were presented by Americans, seven 
by British scholars, two by French colleagues; the other papers were pre-
sented by authors from different countries. 
One of the most important tasks of these conferences was to convince 
the young generation of educational planning experts of the importance 
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of their mission. It was up to a second professor of economics at Ohio 
State University, Samuel C. Kelley, to take up this task. One of the ma-
jor problems, Kelley told conference participants, is that people in tra-
ditional agricultural economies, such as the Mediterranean countries, 
did not have “‘appropriate’ behavior” for the envisaged development, 
so that it was one task to change “human attitudes and motivation which 
result in specific acts of commitment to a work role and a way of life” 
(Kelley, 1962, p. 27). With this transformation towards economic prog-
ress Kelley did not promise a rose garden: “There are no means to eco-
nomic progress that are not, in some degree, coercive” (p. 28). It would 
be “the nature of industrialization” to disrupt traditional arrangements, 
but, as Kelley reassured, “the benefits on an industrial order will exceed 
the costs” (p. 28) of this process. Whereas the developed countries had 
an easier development due to their cultural dispositions, the countries 
developing now would have a harder task: Here, the “process of change 
will require a much greater concern with the means of commitment 
than was evident in the evolution of the [already] developed countries” 
(p. 32). It is exactly here that educational planning plays a crucial role: 
“Educational planning should recognize the implications of education 
in this respect and the patterns of education should develop in ways that 
are consistent with these needs” (p. 34). 
Strategically, the main target groups were not the students or teachers 
but the ministries of economics and education in the different OECD 
countries. During the training course the British administrator Raymond 
F. Lyons—who up to then had been a rather dark horse in the scientif-
ic community—taught the ongoing educational planners how to report 
facts and programs to the national ministers in his lecture, “Formulating 
Recommendations on Educational Needs” (Lyons, 1962). To write a “use-
ful guide for policy makers,” Lyons said, depends on five factors, and these 
factors constituted nothing less than the recipe of an international bu-
reaucratic language in educational policy. First, Lyons advised, the govern-
ments need to be basically committed to the work undertaken by the strat-
egists. Second, the report should always begin with “a short introductory 
chapter summing up clearly and concisely the findings of the investiga-
tion and the conclusions drawn from them”—relativizing or limiting com-
ments on these findings and conclusions are to be omitted (Lyons, 1962, 
p. 245). Third, the report should be “balanced”—balanced meaning offer-
ing a consideration of both educational and economic claims (pp. 245f). 
Fourth, Lyons warned of “too much indulgence in academic exercise” (p. 
246), for it has “no immediate and practical relevance and may do more 
harm than good” (pp. 246ff.). And fifth, Lyons reminded the audience to 
be careful with alternatives to the proposed programmatic steps: 
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It is unwise to introduce into a report the degree of fluidity which 
is inherent in too many alternatives. Moreover, ministers and poli-
ticians are always tempted to accept the alternative which carries 
the lowest cost. Lastly, alternatives may suggest lack of confidence 
on the part of the authors and thus throw doubt on the solidity of 
the report itself. (Lyons, 1962, p. 247) 
Texts or reports by strategists or educational planners are not commit-
ted to academic considerations and possibilities but to clear and unchal-
lenged agendas.
STANDARDIzATION AS OUTCOME AND AS STARTING POINT 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
As did some other OECD countries, the six nations involved in the MRP 
delivered their national reports in the years 1963 and 1964, and they 
were discussed at length in the context of the CSTP and finally pub-
lished in an OECD series titled, “The Mediterranean Regional Project” 
(in Turkey in 1964, in Spain, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia in 1965, and in 
Portugal in 1966); a short summarizing overview was published in 1965 
(OECD, 1965). 
The discussions in the realm of the OECD showed an ambivalent pic-
ture. On the one hand, the reports delivered data that had not existed 
before, but the data from the different countries proved to be not really 
comparable and so were of little use. In a lecture at the third training 
course, held in Germany in July 1964, Frederick H. Harbison, Professor of 
Economics at Princeton University, explained to the strategists-in-training 
that exactly because the different countries were “at different stages of 
modernization,” comparative analysis of comparable data was essential: 
“From the standpoint of practical politics, the consideration that really 
influences policy-makers and even the people as well, is comparison with 
other countries. In this respect, nations resemble individuals—they want 
to keep up with the Joneses. And this is true of all countries, including the 
United States” (Harbison, 1966, p. 54). 
As a matter of fact, the conclusions were sobering. Michel Debeauvais, 
a French administrative scientist who took an international comparative 
approach and former collaborator with the ministry of foreign affairs 
(1947–1959), politely labeled the data from the MRP “of great interest” 
but assessed the data succinctly as “not suitable for international com-
parison for lack of common methodology” (Debeauvais, 1962, p. 85). 
Debeauvais traced the problems identified partly back to the ideological 
differences between educationalists and economists, for educators were 
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identified as “used to talking in terms of teaching and social objectives 
but are chary of the terminology and concerns of economists and man-
power experts” (p. 86). However, the major problem was an appropri-
ate methodology: Comparative statistics had to be developed, for only 
comparative data were considered to be helpful to the mission of the 
OECD. “The qualitative aspects of educational programs are of course 
most important, but are specific to each country and do not lend them-
selves to generalization. Here, again, a number of parameters should be 
considered” (p. 95). 
Accordingly, the need for improved statistics was often repeated. To the 
further development of this concern the first visible fruits of the OECD ac-
tivities were helpful. At the Fourth Conference of the European Ministers 
of Education in 1964, the Committee for Scientific and Technical 
Personnel (CSTP) was assigned to be in charge of planning and invest-
ment in education (STP/M(64)2, p. 13). This assignment was balm for 
the CSTP actors, and the CSTP secretariat immediately published a sepa-
rate note titled, “The Need for Improved Statistics” (STP(64)24). To ful-
fill the assignment, the note says, problems should be solved in order to 
assure that the “statistics of the Member countries will be comparable” 
(STP(64)24, p. 1), and this task was called the “most urgent task since no 
real progress can be made without adequate statistical basis” (p. 2). The 
major mission of the CSTP—longer term economic growth in relation 
to education and scientific research—was even assessed as being at risk 
without “comparable data” (p. 3), so that the “Member countries of the 
OECD are in a position to make a major and trend-setting advance in the 
field of comparative statistics for educational investment planning” (p. 4) 
in order to allow “national authorities to establish in quantitative terms re-
alistic targets for the whole system of education and training” (p. 5). The 
definition of comparable indicators should allow a “continuous statistical 
series showing, on a comparable basis, the educational effort and levels on 
educational attainment in various countries” (p. 5). 
However, not all the OECD countries should profit from these com-
ing developments, for at the same meeting in which the assignment by 
the European Ministers of Education was discussed, the confidential revi-
sion of the STP by the Deputy General-Secretary of the OECD, Michael 
Harris, was announced (STP(64)2, p. 4). In his “Review of the Operational 
Activities of the Organization” (CES(64)22) Harris favored for the future 
those quantitative projects that allowed for comparative data, and he pro-
posed to turn down all experiments that were not paid for by the member 
countries and all qualitatively oriented projects such as curriculum reform 
or the development of teaching aids. 
It is in this context that the idea of central steering by quantified 
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standards and the implementations of partially autonomous units was 
born. This is an idea that was first formulated at the level of OECD and 
individual countries, and then on the level of countries and individu-
al schools. It is an idea that explicitly requires “some reduction of the 
powers wielded by local authorities over educational matters in favor of 
larger regional authorities or of the central government”—or the OECD 
(STP(64)19, p. 23).
According to Harris, curriculum reform had been completed to con-
siderable success; its results were published in 1966 in a report titled, 
“Curriculum Improvement and Educational Development,” with a fore-
word by Harris (OECD, Stoke, Löwbeer, & Capelle, 1966). In particular, 
the financial assistance to all countries was stopped, which triggered a 
heated discussion in the Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel 
(CSTP) (STP/M(64)3, pp. 4–24). Indeed, this suspension of funds—
which was not withdrawn despite the vehement opposition—turned out 
to be a real elk test for the pertinent activities of the OECD. Launched 
in the wake of Sputnik with a tremendous amount of money from the 
United States during 6 years, the crucial question was: What effects were 
to be found? The losers were obviously the countries of the Mediterranean 
Regional Project who had profited from the allocated money—a sarcastic 
reading would be that they were now regarded as developed and thus with-
out additional need of foreign money. But who was the winner? It was the 
OECD. Most of the Western European countries—having participated in 
the program parallel to the MRP, the Investment Planning in Educational 
Development (IPE), were willing to continue and to bear the costs them-
selves. Obviously, they had adopted the planning ideology under the 
keyword of development and had therefore set up administrative orga-
nizations in their respective countries. Of all the countries, Germany had 
been the first, by establishing the Institut für Bildungsforschung (Institute 
for Educational Research) in the realm of the Max-Planck-Society in 
1963–1964.13 The United Kingdom founded the Schools Council for the 
Curriculum and Examinations in 1964, Greece established a National 
Pedagogical Institute in 1964, and the Netherlands founded a Foundation 
for Educational Research in 1965. 
The institutionalizing of the OECD offshoots in the different developed 
countries enabled the development ideology to become a standardized 
model of educational policy. Without these institutions the participation 
of the OECD member countries in the CERI—the Center for Educational 
Research and Innovation founded by the OECD in 1968—would not have 
been conceivable. They had clear ideas about educational planning, about 
development, and about research, and they participated in the OECD 
programs Education at a Glance and PISA, in the beginning somewhat 
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reluctantly but in the end supportingly (Henry, Lingard, Rizvi, & Taylor, 
2001, p. 87; Weymann & Martens, 2005, p. 79). They had forgiven the 
OECD for the fact that they had not really been involved in the planning 
and execution of the different activities or in the selection of the exter-
nal experts and consultants, as they had complained strongly in 1963, 
and had then been told by the secretary, Alexander King, that they were 
not familiar enough with the issues at stake to evaluate the Committee’s 
work (STP/M(63)2, pp. 9f). The Cold War, respectively, the OECD, had 
given them an important place in the reformed educational bureaucra-
cies of their respective countries, and conversely, they implemented the 
new logic of educational planning with reports and popular publications 
published in their countries and not with OECD publications from Paris. 
For instance, the Swede Hans Löwbeer, who became president of the 
Swedish National Board of Education in 1964, published the booklet 
The Educative Society (Löwbeer, 1965) in 1965, and the German Friedrich 
Edding, who became one of the directors of the newly founded Max-
Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung in 1964, published the booklet, 
Bildung und Politik [Education and Politics] (Edding, 1965) in 1965. They 
and their successors continued their work, expanding in their countries 
the educational bureaucracies the same way as the educational systems, 
fulfilling the ambitions of comparative statistics by standardizing the ed-
ucational systems, such as through the Bologna program, and standard-
izing even the school contents, in order to facilitate quantitative compar-
ative research: They contributed heavily to the successful establishment 
of an international bureaucracy of education, or in the language of the 
OECD, of the establishment of an international educational “machin-
ery” (STP(64)19, p. 23 et passim). At the end of the implementation of 
this machinery—around 1970 in the United States, some 20 years later 
in Europe—were the schools, accountable for their performances that 
they had to achieve in direction of predefined standards. 
However, being confirmed in the important roles they played interna-
tionally and nationally and committed to their mission between politics 
and scientific research, over the course of time these experts seem to have 
simply ignored the fact that the Cold War came to an end some while ago 
and that the acknowledgement of cultural diversity and difference is now 
at stake. If the educational bureaucracy and its logic of expertise, stan-
dards, and accountability does not recognize this fact, it might be the duty 
of the educational sciences to remind them, if you will in reports: With a 
short summary in the beginning including the findings, being balanced, 
avoiding too much academic indulgence, and omitting alternatives. It has 
proven to be a successful style. 
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NOTES
1. vannevar Bush (1890–1974) had been an engineer at MIT and developed a 
machine that became known as Rockefeller Differential Analyzer, a modern cal-
culating machine and forerunner of the computer. From 1937 Bush developed 
the Navy Comparator that was to be used to find compliances in coded messages. 
In 1938 Bush became President of the Carnegie Institution for Science, in 1940 
Science Advisor to President Roosevelt and head of the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC), and in 1941 Director of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD). The OSRD coordinated during the Second World War 
the military research programs, among others the Manhattan Project in which 
the atomic bomb was developed, and he was committed to the development of 
the radar and sonar, systems designed to location objects underwater via emitted 
sound impulses. Both radar and sonar helped the U.S. Navy successfully fight the 
German submarines during the war. In 1943 Bush was awarded the des Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Medal for the application of math-
ematics in technology and for his service to the nation in his job as heads of the 
program in weapons development. In April 1944 vannevar Bush was on the front 
cover of Time Magazine and labeled as General of Physics.
2. John Rudolph in his brilliant Scientists in the Classroom (Rudolph, 2002) has 
demonstrated how science education underwent some reforms during the early 
1950s as a consequence of raising critiques towards American education in the 
context of the Second Read Scare of the McCarthy era (Rudolph, 2002, pp. 17ff.). 
One of the major exponents was the American historian Arthur Bestor (1908–
1994) who in his article “Aimlessness in Education” accused the American educa-
tion of subverting the Americans: “The subversion of American intellectual life is 
possible because the first twelve years of formal schooling . . . have fallen under 
the policy-making control of educators who have no real place in—who do not re-
spect, und who are not respected by—the world of science, of scholarship, and of 
the learned professions. The fifth column that engineered this betrayal was com-
posed of professors of education” (Bestor, 1952, p. 114)—a year later followed his 
bestseller Educational Wastelands (Bestor, 1953), repeating the same accusations.
3. The Time Magazine interview with Hyman George Rickover about education-
al questions was not just a flash in the pan; in 1959 Rickover published the book 
Education and Freedom (Rickover, 1959), in which education is defined in a military 
language as “first line of defense” (p. 15). In 1961 the book was republished with 
a foreword by the former military journalist Edward Roscoe Murrow and with a 
preface by Charles van Doren (who had become famous in the quiz show scandal 
Twenty-One). Three years later Rickover published Swiss Schools and Ours: Why 
Theirs are Better (1962), a year later American Education, a National Failure: The 
Problem of Our Schools and What We Can Learn from England (1963), and at the 
end of the 1960s Liberty, Science, and Law (1969).
4. One of the authors of the NDEA, Lister Hill, a liberal democrat from Alabama, 
had as early as in 1941 raised the issue of federal aid to education and in 1947 he 
repeated his claim with regard statistical data according to which the United States 
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spent only 1.5% of its income on education, whereas “other nations such as Britain 
and Russia spent 3 percent and 7.5 percent respectively” (Urban, 2010, p. 17).
5. Just to list some of the 1971 publications on educational accountability: 
Roberson (1971), Jordan (1971), Lieberman (1971), Cornell (1971), Fischer 
(1971), Cupp (1971), and Berg (1971).
6. Actually, Greece and Turkey had been privileged to receive financial aid be-
fore the foundation of the OEEC. In his Special Message to the Congress on Greece and 
Turkey on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman asked Congress for immediate 
financial aid for both Turkey and Greece, which were being threatened by com-
munist rebels: “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. 
They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full 
growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that 
hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining 
their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the 
world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.” Truman was suc-
cessful and was able to convince the congress: Both countries got obtained several 
hundred million dollars by the U.S. government in 1947 (Truman, 1947).
7. The convention was signed on December 14, 1960, in Paris. For an account 
on the transition, see Griffiths (1997).
8. Clausewitz had been a propagator of deterrence through massive armament, 
an idea that was popular in the Cold War. 
9. There is another exception, the welcoming address of the Swedish Minister 
of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs Ragnar Edenman on the occasion of the 
OEEC conference “Ability and Educational Opportunity in a Modern Economy” 
(Edenman, 1961, p. 2). Edenman was not a part of the OECD, but Sweden was, 
of course.
10. In addition to the British suspicion towards working class-friendly sociol-
ogy, the American reformers were reserved towards democracy, because they had 
been bothered constantly by the democratically elected local school boards in the 
communities, which exactly at this time were opposing national testing as federal 
assessment of the schools (Tröhler, 2011).
11. In 1969 the euphoria about the unlimited economic progress and develop-
ment had been dampened. In 1968, Alexander King had become the cofounder 
of the Club of Rome, raising considerable public attention in 1972 with its report 
The Limits to Growth (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972).
12. If we look today at the long-term effect of this program, designed to develop 
the economies and societies of these countries in several decades, we can’t be very 
convinced by the efficiency of it. 
13. One year later, in 1964, the Hamburger Abkommen (Hamburg Treaty) was 
passed in order to harmonize the terminology in schooling, the school year, the 
start and duration of compulsory schooling, vacation, acknowledgements of cer-
tificates, etc. The following year, in 1965, the German Bildungsrat (Education 
Council) was founded in order to cope more efficiently with the different school 
systems in the different Bundesländer. In 1970 the Bund-Länder-Kommission took 
over these issues, and the Bildungsrat dissolved in 1975. 
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